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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE *TATE OF UTAH

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14541

v.
KENNETH YARDLEY, dba
YARDLEY DAIRY,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a declaratory relief action brought by plaintiff,
Truck Insurance Exchange, for a determination that defendant,
Kenneth Yardley, is not afforded insurance coverage under a policy
of irisuxianep issued by plaintiff for claims made against defendant
by one James Cole, who was injured in an accident which occurred
on January 25, 1973 at defendant's business premises,

The only

issue in dispute was whether James Cole was an employee of defendant
whose injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.
I
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURJT
The case was t i:i ed before 3 udge H. Harlan Burns on
April 22, 1975,

On the assumption that evidence could be presented

by defendant at trial to estab] i sh a quest ion of fact, plaintiff
prior to trial requested a jury trial on whatever issues of fact
may arise (R, 19), At the close of evidence plaintiff moved the
Court to rule as a matter of 1 aw that James Cole was an employee

of defendant whose injuries arose out of and in the course of his
employment (Tr, 119-120).
Following arguments by counsel for plaintiff and defendant
which do not appear in the record, the Court found as a matter of
law that James Cole was an employee of defendant in the course of
his employment at the time James Cole was injured (Tr. 121-122 and
R. 44-46).
As to the effect of the employee status of James Cole
upon the issue of coverage for defendant under defendant's policy
with plaintiff for the claims by James Cole against defendant,
the Court took the matter under advisement and allowed counsel
for each party ten days to file a brief on the remaining issues
of law.

The briefs were filed and on February 3, 1976, the trial

Court made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
(R. 44-46) and judgment (R. 47-48) in favor of plaintiff.

Defen-

dant appeals from the judgment of the Court in favor of plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to affirm the findings of
fact and conclusions of law and the judgment made and entered by
the trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 25, 1973, one James Cole was injured while
operating machinery to unload grain from a truck owned by defendant, Kenneth Yardley.

Thereafter, Mr. Cole made claims against

defendant for his injuries sustained in the accident.

At the

time of injury, defendant had coverage with plaintiff under an
-2-

insurance policy issued by plaintiff to defendant which afforded
general liability coverage for defendant's dairy farm, together
with automobile liability coverage (R. 3-5 and 7-9). The said
insurance policy contained the following exclusion:
This policy does not apply under;
(5) Coverages A and G [bodily injury liability and
medical payments coverage], except with respect
to liability assumed by the insured under a
contract ajs defined herein, to bodily injury
or sickness, disease or death of any employee
of the insured arising out of and in the course
of his employment by the insured, other than a
domestic employee whose injury arises out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile covered by this policy and for whose
injury benefits in whole or in part are not
payable or required to be paid under any
workman's compensation law. [emphasis added]
(Exhibit P-l at R. 36)
Thus, the policy excluded coverage for claims made against the
insured by an employee for injuries arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment by the insured.
The only issue in dispute when the case came to trial was
whether James Cole was an employee of defendant whose injuries
arose out of and in the course of his employment by defendant
under the terms of the policy (R. 3-5 and 7-9 and Tr. 119-122).
The only witness called at the time of trial were James
Cole and defendant Kenneth Yardley.

Both witnesses were called

by plaintiff and defendant called no witnesses on his behalf.
James Cole testified that he was a retired truck driver.
In his prior employment as a truck driver he drove moving vans for
two companies (Tr. 4-5). After his retirement he drove a truck
and did various odd jobs for various employers (Tr. 10-11).

The

odd jobs performed by Mr. Cole for the defendant and others were
-3-

to supplement his pension and Social Security income.

He was not

engaged in any business (Tr. 60). The jobs included driving a
truck (Tr. 6 ) , doing carpentry work as an assistant (Tr. 7 ) ,
rounding up cattle (Tr. 8 ) , feeding cattle (Tr. 9 ) , mowing lawns
and repairing leaky faucets (Tr. 10). He never advertised that
he was an expert truck driver (Tr. 10) and he did not have an
office (Tr. 11).
Mr. Cole started working for defendcint, Kenneth Yardley,
in the fall of 1972, at which time defendant hired him to drive
one of defendant's trucks to haul silage to defendant's farm.
Defendant made the arrangements for purchase of the silage, told
Mr. Cole the route to follow, and paid Mr. Cole $2.50 per hour
(Tr. 11-17).

Mr. Cole later built cupboards in defendant's house

at the direction of defendant's wife.

Defendant furnished the

materials and defendant's wife told Mr. Cole how she wanted the
cupboards built.
(Tr. 17-19).

Mr. Cole was paid $3.00 per hour for his labor

Mr. Cole later assisted defendant in nailing boards

to an existing shed.

Defendant furnished the materials and tools,

instructed Mr. Cole as to how he wanted the work performed, and
paid Mr. Cole $2.50 per hour (Tr. 19-20).
About one week to one month after Mr. Cole had hauled
silage for defendant, defendant arranged for Mr. Cole to haul grain
for defendant's dairy operation (Tr. 21). Defendant told Mr. Cole
that he would like Mr. Cole to drive one of defendant's trucks to
Venice, Utah, occasionally when defendant would request that he
do so, to get grain and bring it to defendant's farm.

The trip

to Venice and back took about five hours and defendant agreed to
-4-

pay Mr. Cole $15.00 per trip.

Mr. Cole was paid about the same

amount per hour to drive the truck to Venice and back as he had
been paid for his assistance in working on defendant's shed
(Tr. 61). The trip always took about the same amount of time,
but it was sometimes one-half hour to one hour longer and sometimes one-half hour less.

He "supposes" that the figure of $15.00

per trip was obtained by figuring how many hours it would take to
make the trip and specifying a particular amount per hour (Tr. 70).
On each occasion when he drove defendant's truck to pick
up grain, Mr. Cole received instructions from defendant on the day
before or the day he picked up the grain (Tr. 24). When he
received a call from defendant, Mr. Cole would go to defendant's
place of business, get the truck, and drive to Venice.

The truck

was generally unloaded and ready to go when he arrived (Tr. 26).
When the defendant said that he needed grain, Mr. Cole
had to go to get the grain the next day (Tr. 62). He had no
authority to have anyone else drive the defendant's truck in his
stead (Tr. 63). His agreement with the defendant was not that he
would obtain grain for the defendant and use his own method of
doing it, using anyone else's truck or hiring anyone else to
drive the truck (Tr. 63). The defendant controlled the truck and
controlled when he went to Venice and when he came back (Tr. 64).
The arrangements for purchase of the grain were made
entirely between defendant and the person from whom defendant
purchased the grain (Tr. 23). Mr. Cole always drove defendant's
truck and defendant paid for gasoline and oil.

Defendant would

have paid for any repairs if any had been required (Tr. 23).
-5-

Mr, Cole always followed the same route and defendant told him the
route to follow (Tr. 25). Mr. Cole always drove to Venice and
came back on the same day.

His job was to go to Venice and come

directly back (Tr. 27).
On one trip to pick up grain in Venice, Mr. Cole took his
wife with him and left her in Richfield, Utah, to shop while he
picked up grain.

He had to go through Richfield to get to Venice

and he did not go out of his way.

Defendant told Mr. Cole to take

his wife with him on that occasion (Tr. 47-48).

Mr. Cole

occasionally stopped en route to purchase eggs for himself and his
neighbors (Tr. 48-49).

He picked up the eggs along his route and

he did not go out of his way to get them (Tr. 61-62).

He would not

have driven off his route without the defendant's permission.

He

felt that if he wanted to do anything with defendant's truck other
than go to Venice and back, he would have to ask the defendant's
permission (Tr. 62).
Mr. Cole testified that he unloaded the truck one time
prior to the day he was injured.

The defendant told him to unload

the truck on that occasion and he would not have done anything
without the defendant's approval (Tr. 28). The defendant paid
him $10.00 for his labor (Tr. 28).
On the day before he was injured, Mr. Cole received a call
from the defendant requesting that Mr. Cole get a load of grain.
Mr. Cole went to the defendant's farm the following morning and
saw that there was a little grain left in the corners of the truck.
The defendant told Mr. Cole and John Cartwright, another individual
who was working for the defendant, to empty the grain from the
-6-
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and his father drove to Venice to pick up the grain occasionally
and Mr. Cole also picked up grain for the defendant occasionally
when the defendant needed it (Tr. 82-83).
Under defendant's arrangement with Mr. Cole, Mr. Cole used
the defendant's truck to pick up the grain and defendant paid for
the gasoline and repairs.
truck.

Mr. Cole had no duty to maintain the

Mr. Cole's only job was to drive the truck to Venice, get

the grain, put a tarp over it7 and return to the farm (Tr. 87).
Each time the defendant needed grain, he would call Mr.
Cole the night before and ask Mr. Cole if he could drive to Venice
and pick up grain.

He does not recall ever calling Mr. Cole when

Mr. Cole was unavailable.

If Mr. Cole had been unavailable,

defendant would have asked his father to pick up the grain or
defendant would have done so (Tr. 89-90).
Mr. Cole had no authority to have anyone else drive the
truck in his stead (Tr. 89). Mr. Cole did not have any right to
determine what use to make of the truck when the defendant hired
him to haul grain (Tr. 90). If Mr. Cole borrowed the truck for
other purposes, he could use it for those purposes, but when the
defendant told him to go after grain, he was supposed to get the
grain and come back (Tr. 91). Defendant told Mr. Cole that he
could stop in Richfield if his wife wanted to go shopping and he
could stop and get eggs, but Mr. Cole understood that he was to
return the same day that he left (Tr. 91). The shortest route to
Venice from the defendant's farm is through Cove Fort, Utah, and
he expected Mr. Cole to follow that route (Tr. 93).
The defendant stated that if Mr. Cole did not comply with
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Cole star ting

the machinery, but he wanted to be there to assist (Tr. 115)•
Shortly thereafter he learned that Mr. Cole had been injured by
the machinery (Tr. Ill).
On the basis of the foregoing facts, and viewing them in
the light most favorable to the defendant, the trial Court decided
in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law and made and entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 3, 1976
(Tr. 44-46).

The trial Court found that on the date of the

accident, James Cole was unloading grain from the defendant's truck
for the purposes of preparing the vehicle so that he could fill the
truck with grain from another location and take the grain to defendant1 s place of business, under defendant's orders, supervision
and control (Tr. 45). The Court further found that the injuries
to James Cole arose out of and in the scope of his employment for
the insured as other than a domestic employee, within the terms
of the policy held by defendant with plaintiff (Tr. 45). Based
upon these facts and the other findings of fact and conclusions
of law by the Court set out in the record, the Court concluded
that no coverage was afforded to defendant under the policy of
insurance held by the plaintiff with defendant for the claim made
by James Cole against defendant or for the lawsuit filed by James
Cole against defendant (Tr. 3).
Based upon the trial Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial Court entered a judgment on February 3,
1976, by which it was ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant
is afforded no coverage under his insurance policy with plaintiff
for the claims made by James Cole against defendant or for the
-10-
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in so ruling.
The majority of the Utah cases concerning the issue of
whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor
consists of cases decided under the workman's compensation laws
of the State of Utah.

The cases consistently have held that the

same tests apply under the workman's compensation laws that apply
under the common law distinctions between employees and independent contractors.

See Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 7 3 Utah

430, 274 P. 940 (1929), Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113
Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502 (1948) , Oberhansly v. Travelers Insurance
Company, 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P. 2d 1093 (1956), and Foster v. Steed,
432 P. 2d 60, 19 Utah 2d 435 (1967).

Defendant-appellant has

recognized this fact in his brief, and all or most of the cases
cited therein are cases decided under the workman's compensation
laws of the various states.
The leading Utah case which sets forth the criteria to be
applied in determining whether one acting for another is an
employee or an independent contractor is Christean v. Industrial
Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502 (1948) , which case adopts
the general criteria for distinguishing between an employee and
an independent contractor as are set forth in the Restatement of
Agency, §220, with the exception of the test of whether or not
the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business.
The Court in Christean also held that the most important factor
by far is the right which the master has to control the actions
of the servant.

If the master has the right of control, it is

not material that he does not exercise that control.
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of Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P. 2d
136 (1946) , contending that the Parkinson case "poses a very
similar set of facts" to the present case.

In Parkinson,

defendant Molyneaux made arrangements with Parkinson, the
receiver of Woolsulate, Inc., to haul coke to the company's plant.
Molyneaux was to furnish his own truck and the gasoline and oil
to operate it.

He was. also required to keep the truck in repair

at his own expense.

He was to receive $2.50 per ton for the coke

hauled to the Woolsulate plant from one location and $4.00 for
coke hauled to the Woolsulate plant from another location.
Parkinson told Molyneaux that Woolsulate needed about
thirty-five tons of coke each week, but Molyneaux could haul all
the coke he wanted to, as long as Woolsulate had room to store it.
He was not required to haul the coke on any particular day or at
any particular time and his only obligation was to haul a minimum
of thirty-five tons of coke per week and to unload the coke where
he was directed.

Woolsulate did not have the right to tell

Molyneaux how much to haul in each truckload, how to drive, or
what route to take.

Woolsulate had a bin into which Molyneaux

normally dumped the coke, but if Molyneaux wanted to haul more
coke in any particular week, he was allowed to dump his load in
a separate stockpile.
Molyneaux had purchased his truck in 1942, over two years
prior to the time that he began hauling coke for Woolsulate and
continually thereafter he engaged in the business of trucking for
various individuals, always using his own truck under the same
arrangements.

The Court noted that "he was in the business of a
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up except on the two occasions when it was necessary to remove
grain from the truck before driving it.

Mr. Cole also worked for

defendant building cupboards, nailing boards, and hauling silage.
He worked for others doing various farm chores, mowing lawns,
driving their trucks, and doing whatever jobs were available.

He

never advertised that he was an expert truck driver.
Mr. Cole was also subject to extensive supervision and
control by defendant*

Just as defendant had exercised nearly

total supervision and control over the work performed by Mr. Cole
in the other odd jobs performed by Mr. Cole for defendant,
defendant exercised a very high degree of control over Mr. Cole
in connection with the hauling of grain by Mr. Cole for defendant.
The getting of grain for defendant's dairy cattle was a regular
part of defendant's business.

Defendant and his father often made

the trip to get the grain and defendant also had Mr. Cole make
the trip on frequent occasions.

Each time he wanted Mr. Cole to

make a trip to pick up grain, defendant would tell Mr. Cole that
he wanted Mr. Cole to make the trip the following day.

Mr. Cole

was not free to make the trip whenever he wanted, but had to make
the trip that day.

Mr. Cole could only use defendant's truck.

Mr. Cole had no authority to have anyone else drive the defendant's
truck in his stead and he could not use his own method in obtaining
the grain.

The defendant controlled his truck and controlled when

Mr. Cole went to Venice and when he came back.

Defendant told Mr.

Cole the route to follow.
Although Mr. Cole took his wife with him on one trip to
pick up grain and left her to shop in Richfield, Utah, while he
-16-

got the grain, he did not go out of his way and merely picked up
his wife on his way back.

Defendant told Mr. Cole to take his

wife with him on that occasion.

Although Mr. Cole occasionally

stopped en route to purchase eggs for himself and his neighbors,
there is no evidence that he had "a small egg-selling business"
as defendant-appellant argues in his brief.

There is no indica-

tion that he ever made any profit from the eggs he picked up.

He

picked up the eggs along his route and did not drive out of his
way to get them.

He would not have driven off his route without

the defendant's permission.

Mr. Cole felt that if he wanted to

do anything with defendant's truck other than go to Venice and
back, he would have to ask defendant's permission.
Under the defendant's own testimony, Mr. Cole had no
authority to allow anyone else to drive the truck in his stead
and Mr. Cole did not have any right to determine what use to make
of the truck.

He expected Mr. Cole to follow the shortest route

and told him the route to follow.

If Mr. Cole did not comply

with defendant's instructions, defendant would have had the power
to fire Mr. Cole at any time.

When the defendant sent Mr. Cole

on a trip after grain, Mr. Cole did not have the authority to get
coal or something else in the truck for himself or others. Mr.
Cole was required to return the truck on the same day he left,
although he could stop along the way for a short time if he
wished to do so.
In view of the numerous extensive controls which defendant
exercised over Mr. Cole and the more numerous and extensive rights
which defendant had to control the activities of Mr. Cole as
-17-

discussed herein and in the previous statement of facts, it is
difficult to see how defendant-appellant can contend that James
Cole was an independent contractor, having his own business and
not subject to the control of defendant.

The important factor to

consider being the control or right of control by the master,
there are very few situations in which the master could have more
control over the actions of his servant than the defendant had over
the actions of Mr. Cole as specified above.
Defendant failed to obtain workman's compensation coverage
or other insurance coverage for the employees in his business
operation (Tr. 121), and he would now have the Court decide that
in spite of his failure he should be covered for the loss under
a general liability policy which specifically excludes coverage
for employees injured during the course of their employment under
which rates are set accordingly.

Defendant exercised very exten-

sive control over the activities of James Cole and now asks the
Court not to determine as a matter of law that James Cole was an
employee of defendant.

In that respect, this case is very similar

to the case of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton,

Utah 2d

, 538 P. 2d 316 (1975), in which the Court stated that the
employer wanted the "best of two possible worlds."

The Court

stated that the employer wanted:
On the one hand, to have a person rendering a
service over whom he can maintain a high degree
of control; and at the same time give the
person the status of an independent contractor
to avoid the responsibilities he would have
to an employee.
In Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, supra, the
-18-

defendant drove a truck for the plaintiff under a contractual
arrangement with plaintiff by which he would lease the plaintiff's
truck and be paid on a per mile basis.

He then received instruc-

tions from the plaintiff as to when and where to drive the truck.
The defendant was injured while climbing on the truck to secure
his load and he sought to obtain an award of workman's compensation on the basis that he was an employee of the plaintiff.

The

Court held that in spite of the efforts by plaintiff to disguise
the true nature of the relationship, the defendant was an employee
of the plaintiff.
In the present case, unlike the Ashton case, the defendant
did not even attempt to disguise the relationship of employeremployee existing between defendant and James Cole prior to the
accident upon which Mr. Cole based his claims against defendant.
It was only after the injury that the defendant determined that
it would be in his interest to establish that the relationship
was not that of employer and employee.

From the facts set out

above, it is clear that the defendant had an almost total right
to control the activities of James Cole and he exercised that
right to a great extent.

He should not be allowed now to have

possessed that almost total control over Mr. Cole and yet, when
it suits his purposes, have Mr. Cole considered by the courts
as an independent contractor.
A case which is very persuasive on the issue in question
is Dalton v. Industrial Commission, 8 Utah 2d 353, 334 P. 2d
763 (1959).

In that case, the plaintiff was injured while trans-

porting an automobile from Rock Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah
-19-

for Wayne Rasmussen Company, a new and used car sales business.
The company customarily used regular employees to transport the
cars but charged the extra amounts which the employees were paid
for transporting the cars to the cost of the cars.

The company

occasionally hired people who were not its regular employees to
transport cars and charged the amounts paid to those persons to
the cost of the cars in the same manner.

A representative of the

company approached the plaintiff and his brother and asked if they
would like to transport cars from Rock Springs, Wyoming, to Utah.
The representative said that the plaintiff and his brother would
receive $25.00 for their services, out of which they were to pay
their own bus fare of $5.00.

All expenses for oil, gas or any

emergency repairs were to be paid by the company.

The Industrial

Commission held that the plaintiff was not an employee of the
company in transporting the car and the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the amount which the plaintiff received was compensation and wages and the plaintiff was an employee of the company.
If the plaintiff in Dalton was considered to be an employee
of the Wayne Rasmussen Company, surely the trial Court properly
held as a matter of law that James Cole was an employee of defendant at the time of the accident in which Mr. Cole was injured.
In Dalton there is no indication that the amounts received by
the plaintiff for his services had any relation to the time
involved in performing those services.

The plaintiff had not

worked for the company previously and there was no indication
that the transporting of the car was a continuation of previous
work for the company.

Most importantly, there was no indication
-20-

that the company exercised the very high degree of control over
the plaintiff in Dalton that the defendant exercised and had the
right to exercise over Mr. Cole in the present case.

As indicated

previously, the defendant controlled or had a right to control
virtually every activity by Mr. Cole during the time that Mr.
Cole was using the defendant's truck to pick up grain and haul it
to the defendant's farm.

The defendant did not object if Mr. Cole

made brief stops en route, but he demanded that Mr. Cole return
with the truck the same day he took the truck.

Mr. Cole was not

free to use the truck in any manner he wished and in every other
respect his activities were controlled by defendant.
In view of this very extensive control, plaintiff-respondent
respectfully submits that the evidence clearly supports the finding
of the trial Court that reasonable minds could not differ on the
question of whether James Cole was an employee of defendant whose
injuries arose out of and in the scope of his employment by
defendant, and the trial Court properly ruled as a matter of law
that James Cole was such an employee.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, THAT JAMES COLE'S INJURIES AROSE OUT OF
AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY
DEFENDANT.
Point II of the brief of defendant-appellant is difficult
to understand but it appears to be contending that the trial Court
improperly ruled that the injuries of James Cole arose out of and
-21-

in the scope of his employment for the insured (the defendant).
The argument is based on semantics, in that the Court ruled at the
time of trial, as a matter of law, that James Cole was an employee
of defendant at the time he was injured (Tr,. 119-122) and the
Court's findings of fact, based upon the Court's determination at
trial, state that "the injuries of James Cole arose out of and in
the scope of his employment for the insured as other than a
domestic employee" (R. 45). In other words, the Court ruled on
the existence of this fact in connection with its ruling that
James Cole was an employee of defendant at the time he was injured,
both as a matter of law.
Even if there were any substance to the argument contained
in Point II of appellant's brief, this Court should not consider
the matter in that the issue is being raised for the first time
on this appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court consistently has held

that it will not consider a matter raised for the first time on
appeal.

See State By and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 27

Utah 2d 295, 495 P. 2d 817 (1972), Wagner v. 01sen, 25 Utah 2d
366, 482 P. 2d 702 (1971), and In re Ekker's Estate, 432 P. 2d
45, 19 Utah 2d 414 (1967).
When the Court ruled on the motion of plaintiff-respondent
at the close of the evidence, it is apparent that the Court and
the attorneys for the parties presumed that the decision was being
made on the entire issue, i.e. whether James Cole was an employee
of defendant whose injuries arose out of and in the scope of his
employment (Tr. 119-124).

It is further clear from the Court's

findings of fact and conclusions of law that the Court decided
-22-

the entire issue as a matter of law (R. 44-46).
Defendant made no objection to the trial Court's findings
in the Court below and never raised the issue at any time until
this appeal.

Following the trial Court's rulings at trial the

defendant submitted a Memorandum of Points and Authorities to
the Court on the remaining issues, as requested by the Court.
The memorandum discusses the trial Court's ruling that James Cole
was an employee of defendant, but the memorandum raises no other
issues.

Defendant made no objections to the findings of fact and

conclusions of law submitted to the trial Court by plaintiff,
either before or after the trial Court reviewed and signed the
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The defendant made no

post-trial motions and never raised the issue until the defendantappellant's brief was filed with this Court.I
If this Court were to accept the contentions made in
Point II of defendant-appellant's brief, this Court would have to
conclude that the issue cannot be considered by this Court on
appeal, since the matter was never raised in the Court below.
In any event, from a review of the evidence produced at
trial it is clear that James Cole was within the scope of his
employment with defendant at the time he was injured.

The grain

elevator which Mr. Cole was operating at the time he was injured
belonged to the defendant, it was on defendant's business property,
and Mr. Cole was using the elevator to remove grain from defendant's truck so that Mr. Cole could use the truck to get more
grain for defendant pursuant to defendant's instructions.

Mr.

Cole testified that defendant specifically told him to unload the
-23-

grain but defendant denied having told him to do so.

Defendant

testified, however, that Mr. Cole had unloaded the truck
previously and knew how to operate the grain elevator.

Defen-

dant had no objection to Mr. Cole operating the grain elevator
but he wanted to be there to assist.
Even if we assume that defendant had not instructed Mr.
Cole to operate the grain elevator on that occasion, it is clear
that Mr. Cole was operating within the scope of his employment.
With respect to injuries sustained by an employee outside his
actual working hours, 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, §182,
states:
The master-servant relationship is not restricted
to the employee's actual working hours but includes
those times when the employee is on the employer's
premises and engaged in the performance of his
services or duties incidental thereto. Thus, the
relationship may exist with respect to an employee
on the premises of the employer while going to his
work and may continue for a reasonable time after
working hours for the purpose of allowing the
servant sufficient time to leave the premises, or
for so long as the employee is on the employer's
premises, engaged in the actual or incidental
duties of his employment, or subject to the
employer's control....
The matter of scope of employment in those circumstances
is covered in the annotation found at 7 6 A.L.R. 2d 1215, entitled
Liability of Master for Injury or Death of Servant on Master's
Premises Where Injury Occurred Outside Working Hours.

The cases

cited in the annotation make it clear that the injuries sustained
by the employee may occur before or after his employment and he
will still be considered within the scope of his employment.
of the cases cited in the annotation is Geanakoules v. Union
-24-

One

Portland Cement Company, 41 Utah 486, 126 P. 329 (1912).

In

Geanakoules the plaintiff came upon the defendant's premises to
look for work.

He talked to the foreman and the foreman said,

"I'll give you a job; you can start with the whistle; take off
your coat and start on your job."

Before the plaintiff started

to work he inquired about and was directed to the toilet.

On his

way to the toilet, he stepped on hot ashes and burned his foot,
for which injuries he sued the defendant company.

The Court held

that the plaintiff was not a trespasser or a mere licensee, but
rather an employee of defendant at the time <j>f the accident, even
though he had not yet begun his employment.
In another context, the Utah Supreme ^ourt has held that
even a battery by an employee upon a customer of the employer may
be considered within the scope of the employee's employment if it
is committed in furtherance of the principal's interests.

See

Barney v. Jewel Tea Company, 104 Utah 292, 139 P. 2d 878, and
Stone v. Hearst Lumber Company, 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P. 2d 910
(1963).

Adopting the defendant's version of the facts in the

present case, it is clear that James Cole was acting within the
scope of his employment at the time he was injured.

Defendant

did not instruct the plaintiff not to unload the truck, the truck
had to be unloaded in order to make it ready for another load of
grain, Mr. Cole had unloaded the truck before and knew how to
unload it, and defendant had no objection to Mr. Cole starting
the machinery to unload the truck.
A case particularly in point on this issue is Milbank
Mutual Insurance Company v. Biss, 161 N.W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1968).
-25-

In Biss, the insured had a policy very similar to the policy held
by defendant with plaintiff in the present case which excluded
coverage for liability of the insured for injuries to his
employees arising out of and in the course of their employment.
The insured operated a farm and hired the claimant and other boys
to assist in harvesting grain.

The claimant's compensation was

not to begin until he started working in the grain field.

While

waiting for the machinery used in harvesting the grain to begin
functioning, the claimant was sent to the insured's farmyard to
prepare the grainery bin for receiving oats which were being
harvested.

On the way back from the grainery bin, the claimant

fell out of the truck in which he was riding and was injured.
The trial Court held that, based upon the facts presented, the
claimant was not acting within the scope of his employment since
he was not to receive compensation for the work he was performing
and the work for which he was to receive compensation was totally
unrelated and in a distant location from the work he was performing
when he was injured.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding as a

matter of law that the claimant was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident.
If the claimant in Biss was acting within the scope of his
employment, it is clear that James Cole was acting within the
scope of his employment with defendant in the case at bar.

Not

only was Mr. Cole doing work preparatory to the work which he was
required to perform for defendant, but he had done the work before,
it was essential to his performing his duties as required by
defendant and it involved the same equipment (the truck) which he
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would be using in carrying out his employment with defendant.
Therefore, it is clear that the trial Court properly found, as a
matter of law, that James Cole was acting within the scope of his
employment by defendant at the time he was iniured.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the cases, authorities, and analysis set
forth above, the evidence presented at trial clearly supports the
trial Court's finding, as a matter of law, that James Cole was an
employee of defendant whose injuries arose omt of and in the scope
of his employment by defendant.

Point II of appellant's brief

was not raised at any time in the lower Court prior to this
appeal and, therefore, it should not be considered.

If it were

I
considered, however, the evidence presented at trial clearly
supported the trial Court's finding, as a matter of law, that
the injuries sustained by James Cole arose out of and in the
course of his employment by the defendant,

plaintiff-respondent,

therefore, respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the
judgment made and entered by the trial Court, based upon the
Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Respectfully submitted,
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